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No. 20170022-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

v.
TRAVIS SCOTT MURRAY,

Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant is not incarcerated
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Murray appeals from the trial court's order revoking and reinstating
Murray's probation, and sentencing him to 180 days in jail. The trial court's
sentencing decision was made following a probation hearing where Murray
admitted violating certain conditions of his probation. Murray argues that the
trial court's sentencing decision was an abuse of discretion. Murray respectfully
asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order revoking and reinstating his
"

probation with a jail sentence. He requests that his case be remanded for
resentencing.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e). See
Addendum A (Post Sentencing Judgment/Commitment).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked and
reinstated Murray's probation and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.
Standard of Review: "The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is
in the discretion of the trial court." State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah
1990). This Court "will reverse a probation decision only when it is 'clear that the
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute
an abuse of discretion."' State v. Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, ,I7, 330 P.3d 760
(quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). The trial
court's "exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court." State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, ,I6, 255 P.3d 689 (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved by trial counsel's argument to allow
Murray to continue on probation without revoking probation and imposing a jail
sentence. See R. 102, 105-107.
To the extent this issue is not preserved, this Court should review it for
plain error. ''To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
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favorable outcome for the appellant."' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I13, 10 P.3d
~

346 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are provided in Addendum B: Utah Code §41-6a-503; Utah

·..;;J

Code §77-18-1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
On January 27, 2014, Murray pleaded guilty to one count of Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a third degree felony. See R. 40-42. On March 17,
2014, the trial court sentenced Murray to a suspended prison term not to exceed
five years, 100 days jail, and a fine of $2,876.70, and placed him on 36 months
probation. R. 40-42.
On November 14, 2014, AP&P filed a probation violation report alleging
that Murray missed some of his mandated testing appointments, but was
vi

"making progress" in treatment and other areas of his life. R. 52-55. Thus, AP&P
recommended that the "situation be viewed as an Alternative Event." R. 52-55.
The trial court so ordered. R. 55.
Fifteen months later, on February 22, 2016, AP&P filed an affidavit in
support of order to show cause, alleging that Murray violated the terms and
conditions of probation by committing new crimes and infractions, and using
controlled substances. R. 56-63. The allegations were as follows: (1) using
controlled substances on January 8, 2016; (2) using a controlled substance on
February 3, 2016; (3) committing the infraction of driving over gore area or
3
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island on February 20, 2016; (4) committing the Class C Misdemeanor of ignition
interlock violation on February 20, 2016; (5) committing the Class C
Misdemeanor of driving on suspension on February 20, 2016; (6) committing the
Class C Misdemeanor of operating vehicle without insurance on February 20,
2016; (7) committing the Class B Misdemeanor of use or possession of drug

paraphernalia on February 20, 2016; and (8) committing the third degree felony
of controlled substance schedule I or II on February 20, 2016. R. 56-58.
The trial court issued an arrest warrant on February 24, 2016. R. 67-69. On
March 24, 2016, an updated affidavit was filed with two additional allegations:
(9) failing to report as directed on February 23, 2016; and (10) leaving the state of

Utah without prior written approval on March 22, 2016. R. 70-78.
The trial court appointed counsel, and set the matter for an order to show
cause hearing on December 12, 2016. R. 83-84. At the December 12 hearing,
Murray admitted allegations 1, 4, 6, and 9 as stated in the affidavit and order to
show cause dated March 23, 2016, and denied the remaining allegations. R. 8788; see R. 74-76. The state andAP&P recommended revocation of probation and

one year in jail. R. 70-73, 104, 105.
Trial counsel advised the court that the defense disagreed with AP&P's
recommendation. R. 102 ("We don't stipulate to the jail that will be requested by
AP&P."). Trial counsel explained that Murray's violations arose from financial
struggles and homelessness, and argued that Murray should not be revoked from
probation. R. 105-107. Trial counsel argued that Murray "did well for a while" on
4
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probation, "has ["shown"] the ability and the desire" to complete treatment, and
vi

"would very much like the opportunity to do treatment again, to do treatment
and probation." R.

106-107. Trial

counsel emphasized that Murray valued

substance abuse treatment and completed it while on probation. R.
71-22.

106; see

R.

Trial counsel explained that "[h]e was unable to pay the fine which I think

is why his probation wasn't closed out sooner but that's not uncommon with a
fine of close to $3000." R.

106-107. Trial

counsel acknowledged that Murray

relapsed after he became homeless for the first time in his life, which "he did not
handle appropriately and[] that caused him to be in violation of his probation."

R.

105-107.

Additionally, trial counsel and Murray argued that Murray's circumstances
had improved and that his pro-social attitude would allow him to be successful on
probation. R.

106, 108-109.

For example, trial counsel explained that Murray

"understands that what he did was not appropriate, that he needs to stay in the
state," and that Murray had "a place to live in [Utah] which he previously did not
have." R.

106.

Murray told the trial court that he had "the will to remain sober

and clean" and had "shown that for AP&P[] for the last three years by completing
[treatment] courses." R. 108. Murray said he lost his way after "not having a place
\J.j)

to live" and "not being able to pay the fines." R.

109.

However, Murray "would

like to get back on the right track and remain clean and get a job and be a
productive member of society." R.

109.

5
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After hearing from the parties, the trial court stated "this is important
information, Mr. Murray, but what you and your defense attorney are asking me
to do is just kind of treat this [as] something different than it is." R. 109-110. The
trial court emphasized Murray's history of DUI crimes and that Murray's
probation violations created a "dangerous situation to yourself, to your family
and to the community as a whole." R. 110. The trial court advised Murray that he
should have gone to AP&P and asked for more treatment, rather than "just
saying, 'Well, I can blow it off and do it on my own."' R. 110-111. The trial court
continued, "what I take into consideration is[] that you have failed to comply with
felony DUI probation." R. 110. The trial court said that "[t]he fact that you have
done what you have done, Mr. Murray, is the basis for my not imposing the
prison sentence right now", but "if you don't succeed, I'm going to be imposing
the original sentence as the sanction." R. 110-111.
The trial court revoked Murray's probation, reinstated probation for 12
months beginning December 12, 2016, and sentenced Murray to 180 days in jail.

R. 87-88. The trial court further ordered that Murray "successfully complete the
CATS Program in jail" and "may be released upon successful completion of the
CATS Program." 1 R. 111; R. 87-88. The remaining allegations were stricken. R.

87-88. Murray timely appeals. R. 89-94.

Murray has completed his jail sentence. He is serving the revoked and reinstated
probation term that is the subject of this appeal.

1
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Murray argues that the trial court's decision to revoke and reinstate his
probation and sentence to 180 days in jail was so inherently unfair as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
Murray argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked
and reinstated his probation and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. This Court
"reviews the district court's decision to grant, modify or revoke probation for
abuse of discretion." State v. Brooks, 2012 UT App 34, ,rs, 271 P.3d 831. Because
the "granting or withholding of probation involves considering intangibles of
character, personality and attitude," a district court has "complete discretion"
with respect to its decision. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1049 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). This Court "will reverse a probation decision only
when it is 'clear that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to
constitute an abuse of discretion."' Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, ,r7 (quoting

Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Utah Code governs probation violation and revocation hearings. See
Utah Code §77-18-1(12). A defendant's "[p]robation may not be revoked except
~

upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been
violated." Utah Code §77-18-1(12)(a)(ii). "At the hearing, the defendant shall
admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit." Utah Code §77-18-1(12)(d)(i).
"Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
7
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may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or reinstated for all or a

portion of the original term of probation." Utah Code §77-18-1(12)(e)(ii)
(emphasis added).
Murray maintains that the trial court's decision to revoke and reinstate his
probation and sentence him to jail was "so inherently unfair as to constitute an
abuse of discretion" because the trial court failed to weigh Murray's commitment
to sobriety and history of treatment compliance while on probation. Rhodes, 818
P.2d at 1051 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For example,
Murray accepted accountability for his behavior and recognized that his relapse
resulted from his irresponsible reaction to "not having a place to live" and "not
being able to pay the fines." R. 109. However, as Murray explained, he had "the
will to remain sober and clean" and had "shown that for AP&P[] for the last three
years by completing [treatment] courses." R. 108; R. 106; see R. 71. Indeed, AP&P
confirmed that Murray completed treatment for his underlying DUI offense while
on probation. R. 71-72. Additionally, the record suggests that Murray's inability
to pay the "fine of close to $3000" explains "why his probation wasn't closed out
sooner." R. 106-107. Moreover, Murray's circumstances had improved by the
time of the hearing, and he expressed his desire "to get back on the right track
and remain clean and get a job and be a productive member of society." R. 109.
In light of Murray's commitment to sobriety and history of treatment
compliance while on probation, Murray argues that "no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Valdez, 2016 UT App 74,
8
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,r2, 372 P.3d 85 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
v;

omitted). Instead, Murray contends that the trial court should have allowed him
to complete probation without a revocation, jail sentence, or reinstatement of
probation. R. 105-107; R. 107 ("[Murray] would very much like the opportunity to
do treatment again, to do treatment and probation."); see Utah Code §77-181(12)(e)(ii).

Plain error.
This issue is preserved by trial counsel's argument to allow Murray to
continue on probation without revoking and reinstating probation and imposing
a jail sentence. R. 102, 105-107. To the extent this Court believes any aspect of
Murray's argument is not preserved, this Court should reverse for plain error. "To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant."' Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r13 (alteration in original)
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09).
First, the trial court's decision to revoke and reinstate Murray's probation
and impose a jail sentence was erroneous. See discussion supra.
~

Second, the error should have been obvious. The "obviousness requirement
poses no rigid and insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d
29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Murray need only "show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the
9
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alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,I16, 95 P.3d 276. Indeed,
Utah law is clear that a trial court's sentencing decision may not be "so inherently

4:i-

unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051
(emphasis omitted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
discussion supra. The inherent unfairness of the trial court's sentencing decision
should have been obvious because the sentence conflicted with the
recommendations made by the state, AP&P, and trial counsel. For instance, the
state and AP&P recommended that the trial court revoke Murray's probation with
a jail sentence. R. 70-73, 104-105. And trial counsel asked for Murray to continue
on probation with no jail time. R. 105-107. Thus, the error of the trial court's
decision to revoke and reinstate probation with a jail sentence should have been
obvious.
Third, as explained above, the error was prejudicial because there was '"a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome"' "'absent the error[s]."' State

v. Cox, 2012 UT App 234, ,I2, 286 P.3d 15 (quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,I26,
128 P.3d 1179); see discussion supra. Absent the trial court's abuse of discretion,
Murray would have continued on probation without serving a jail sentence and
likely completed his probationary period earlier. See discussion supra. Thus, the
trial court plainly erred in revoking and reinstating Murray's probation with a jail
sentence.

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Murray respectfully asks this Court to reverse
and remand the trial court's order revoking and reinstating probation, and
remand for resentencing.

fh

SUBMITTED this.$__ day of July, 2017.

DIANA PIERSON

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1), I
certify that this brief contains 2,427 words, excluding the table of contents, table
of authorities, addenda, and certificates of compliance and delivery. In
compliance with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b), I certify that
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft
Word 2010 in Georgia 13 point.

DIANA PIERSON
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 12, 2016
02:05 :48 PM

1,,i~'ii,,,

~!:..,_

At the ~JE,.,t..ttf<£.Ii.
Isl ANN
Distriq\
by
'-':-:.. ..:·-~,.~,:~,·~~.,(

~9!~\·\ \
q{"jt ·}
.l

Isl PATRICht9}§~S,!!!···
District Court Clerk

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES

Plaintiff,

POST SENTENCING JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 131908284 FS

TRAVIS SCOTT MURRAY,

Judge:

ANN BOYDEN

Date:

December 12, 2016

Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk:
\;j)

patd

Prosecutor: SUTTON, SAMUEL P
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DUNROE, SHARLA M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 24, 1980
Sheriff Office#: 397103
Audio
Tape Number:

S45

Tape Count: 1100-1118

CHARGES
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 01/27/2014 Guilty

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated in the Affidavit and
Order to Show Cause: 1-4-6-9
~

The defendant denies the following numbered allegations as stated in the Affidavit and
Order to Show Cause: Remaining
The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 12 months beginning 12/12/2016.
SENTENCE JAIL
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Case No: 131908284 Date:

Dec 12, 2016

Defendant is to serve 180 Days
Defendant is granted credit for time served.
Commitment is to begin immediately.
POST SENTENCE JAIL NOTE
Credit for Time Served From 11/22/2016. Early Release Upon Successfuly Completion of
CATS Program
Remaining Allegations Stricken. Original Terms - AP&P. If Failure to Comply With AP&P,
Original Prison Sentence Imposed.
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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Utah Code§ 41-6a-503
§ 41-6a-503. Penalties for driving under the influence violations

(1) A person who violates for the first or second time Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense;
or
(iii) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.
(2) A person who violates Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a third degree felony if:
(a) the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(b) the person has two or more prior convictions as defined in Subsection
41-6a-501(2), each of which is within 10 years of:
(i) the current conviction under Section 41-6a-502; or
(ii) the commission of the offense upon which the current conviction is based; or
(c) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is at any time after a conviction of:
(i) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1,
2001;

(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this
state that would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 that is committed after
July 1, 2001; or
(iii) any conviction described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) or (ii) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402.
(3) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering bodily injury or
serious bodily injury as a result of the person's violation of Section 41-6a-502 or death
as a result of the person's violation of Section 76-5-207 whether or not the injuries arise
from the same episode of driving.

Credits

Laws 2005, c. 2, § 59, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 91, § 2, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws
2007, c. 261, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 214, § 2, eff. May 12, 2009.
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Utah Code § 77-18-1
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Pleas held in

abeyance--Probation--Supervision--Presentence
investigation--Standards--Confidentiality--Terms and conditions--Termination,
revocation, modification, or extension--Hearings--Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in

abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of any
crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation under the supervision of an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on court probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b )(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(iv) Court probation may include an administrative level of services, including
notification to the court of scheduled periodic reviews of the probationer's
compliance with conditions.
(c) Supervised probation services provided by the department, an agency of local
government, or a private organization shall specifically address the offender's risk of
reoffending as identified by a validated risk and needs screening or assessment.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based
on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the results of a risk and needs assessment;
(iii) the demand for services;
(iv) the availability of agency resources;
(v) public safety; and
(vi) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services
shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review
and comment prior to adoption by the department.
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Vii

vJ

(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement
the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they
consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report
and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or
infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B
misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the
department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203
describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family;
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation
from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted
under Section 77-18-1.1;
(iv) recommendations for treatment of the offender; and
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the offender has
spent in the custody of the jail and the number of days, if any, the offender was
released to a supervised release or alternative incarceration program under Section
17-22-5.5.
(c) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor,
and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by
the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after 10 working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and
accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
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(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in
open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on
probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program
in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to
the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail
the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic
monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the
compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the
defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate
prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in
Subsection (S)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21
during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection
77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
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(10 )(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions, or
as allowed pursuant to Section 64-13-21 regarding earned credits.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10 )(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined
in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of
the account receivable. If the court retains jurisdiction for this limited purpose, the
court may order the defendant to pay to the court the costs associated with
continued probation under this Subsection (10).
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of
civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately
transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt
Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the
defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when
termination of supervised probation is being requested by the department or will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report
of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(n)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning
revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(iii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning
revocation of probation constitutes service of time toward a term of incarceration
imposed as a result of the revocation of probation or a graduated sanction imposed
under Section 63M-7-404.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may be modified as is consistent with the graduated sanctions and
incentives developed by the Utah Sentencing Commission under Section 63M-7-404,
but the length of probation may not be extended, except upon waiver of a hearing by the
probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
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the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on
the defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an
order to show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall
be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the defendant is
indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the
affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant
unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the
court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or reinstated for all or
a portion of the original term of probation.
(iii) If a period of incarceration is imposed for a violation, the defendant shall be
sentenced within the guidelines established by the Utah Sentencing Commission
pursuant to Subsection 63M-7-404(4), unless the judge determines that:
(A) the defendant needs substance abuse or mental health treatment, as
determined by a validated risk and needs screening and assessment, that
warrants treatment services that are immediately available in the community; or
(B) the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(iv) If the defendant had, prior to the imposition of a term of incarceration or the
execution of the previously imposed sentence under this Subsection (12), served
time in jail as a condition of probation or due to a violation of probation under
Subsection 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii), the time the probationer served in jail constitutes
service of time toward the sentence previously imposed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent
of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court
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that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state
hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title
63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding
Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of
sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence
investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation
report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the
victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by
the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant,
or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under
the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and
76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in
accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order
the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring as described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
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and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the
court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section
either directly or by contract with a private provider.
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